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Strikingly Suspicious Overnight and Intraday Returns
Bruce Knuteson
The world’s stock markets display a strikingly suspicious pattern of overnight and intraday returns.
Overnight returns to major stock market indices over the past few decades have been wildly positive,
while intraday returns have been disturbingly negative. The cause of these astonishingly consistent
return patterns is unknown. We highlight the features of these extraordinary patterns that have
hindered the construction of any plausible innocuous explanation. We then use those same features
to deduce the only plausible explanation so far advanced for these strikingly suspicious returns.
I. OVERNIGHT AND INTRADAY RETURNS
Over the past few decades, the world’s stock markets
have displayed a stunning pattern of overnight and intra-
day returns. This stunning pattern is not widely known.
There is no consensus as to the cause.
We have previously provided the only plausible ex-
planation so far advanced for this remarkable pattern
of overnight and intraday returns [1–3]. Our previous
articles emphasized our explanation, taking for granted
our readers’ ability to understand that suspicious return
patterns in financial markets indicate a problem. This
article describes the extraordinary pattern of overnight
and intraday returns in the world’s stock markets (Sec-
tion I), explains why the most popular innocuous ex-
planations are wrong (Section II), constructs a plausible
explanation (Section III), and concludes that these strik-
ingly suspicious return patterns indicate a serious and
urgent problem (Section IV).
Figure 1 shows overnight and intraday returns to
twenty-one major stock market indices around the world.
The intraday (green) curves cumulate returns from mar-
ket open to market close. The overnight (blue) curves
cumulate returns from market close to the next day’s
market open. Over the past two decades, for example,
Canada’s TSX 60 (top right plot in Figure 1) has had a
whopping +1,062% return overnight compared to a wrist-
slitting intraday return of -67%. The rest of the world in
Figure 1 displays the same general pattern – large posi-
tive overnight returns and large negative intraday returns
– in varying degrees of outrageousness. The exception is
China [1, 4].
Figure 1 is so egregious you may suspect a mistake,
but no mistake has been made. These shocking return
patterns have been noted in the literature for a decade [4–
12]. You can reproduce them yourself using data publicly
available from Yahoo! Finance and the code at Ref. [13].
These bewildering patterns are present in indices and in
the ETFs that track them. These amazing patterns are
robust to using the price shortly after market open rather
than the official open price, to using the price shortly
before market close rather than the official close price,
and to using data from different data providers. These
and other robustness checks are described in the litera-
ture [4–12]. The overnight and intraday return patterns
in Figure 1 are very robust.
II. STRIKINGLY SUSPICIOUS
Figure 1 is strikingly suspicious. No variation of “re-
turns are due to the bearing of risk” can explain such
large negative intraday returns. The uncoordinated ac-
tions of millions of individual traders should not produce
such strikingly consistent return patterns. In this sec-
tion we consider a few popular innocuous explanations
for Figure 1 and explain why each is wrong.
Consider the possibility that quarterly company earn-
ings announcements in the United States (outside reg-
ular trading hours) are responsible for the top row of
Figure 1 [15]. You can falsify this attempted explanation
by removing the returns around earnings announcements
and noting that this does not meaningfully change the
plots (as in Section 4.1 of Ref. [5]). Alternatively, you
can simply note that company earnings announcements
cannot explain the consistently negative intraday returns
in Figure 1.
Consider the possibility that the spectacular patterns
in Figure 1 arise because “almost all price discovery hap-
pens overnight.” You can falsify this attempted explana-
tion by noting that most price movement actually hap-
pens intraday [6] [16], not overnight. Alternatively, you
can simply note that “almost all price discovery happens
overnight” does not explain the consistently negative in-
traday returns in Figure 1.
Consider the possibility that Figure 1 arises because
of overnight capital costs [11]. You can falsify this at-
tempted explanation for each plot in Figure 1 by ex-
plicitly including the relevant overnight capital cost and
noting that this inclusion is not enough to materially
change the picture. Alternatively, you can simply note
that overnight capital costs cannot explain the consis-
tently negative intraday returns shown in Figure 1.
Consider the possibility that millions of individual
“retail traders” have systematically different preferences
from “institutional traders,” that the trades of retail
traders are relatively more important earlier in the day
than later in the day, and that this persistent difference in
preferences is responsible for Figure 1 [10]. Anyone who
has ever interacted with people can falsify this attempt
by noting that the patterns in Figure 1 are far more con-
sistent than the preferences of millions of individual retail
traders over three decades.
Consider the possibility that Figure 1 is due to “ETF
arbitrageurs.” You can falsify this attempted explanation
ar
X
iv
:2
01
0.
01
72
7v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  5
 O
ct 
20
20
20
+1288%
 -8%
United States
S&P 500 SPDR ETF
overnight
intraday
0
+3402%
 -30%
United States
NASDAQ Composite
0
+1062%
 -67%
Canada
iShares TSX 60 ETF
0
+3432%
 -94%
Australia
SPDR S&P/ASX 200 Fund
0
+8993%
 -97%
Brazil
iShares MSCI Brazil Capped ETF
0
+55,828%
 -99.10%
Mexico
iShares MSCI Mexico Capped ETF
0
+1209%
 -89%
United Kingdom
iShares Core FTSE 100 ETF
0
+598%
 -62%
France
CAC 40
0
+1532%
 -64%
Germany
DAX
0
+1197%
 -67%
Netherlands
AEX
0
+2057%
 -87%
Norway
DNB OBX ETF
0
+2500%
 -97%
Italy
iShares FTSE MIB ETF
0
+732%
 -83%
Israel
TA-125
0
+1868%
 -87%
India
NIFTY 50
0
+628,056%
 -99.86%
India
S&P BSE SENSEX
0
+2225%
 -96%
Singapore
SPDR Straits Times Index ETF
0
+5246%
 -94%
Korea
KOSPI Composite Index
0
+124,122%
 -99.89%
Taiwan
TSEC Weighted Index
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0
+1142%
 -95%
Japan
Nikkei 225
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0
+2342%
 -66%
Hong Kong
Hang Seng Index
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0 -86%
 +1797%China
SSE Composite Index
Overnight and Intraday Returns to Major Stock Market Indices
FIG. 1: Cumulative overnight (blue curve) and intraday (green curve) returns to twenty-one major stock market indices over
three decades. Each overnight (blue) curve cumulates returns from market close to the next day’s market open. Each intraday
(green) curve cumulates returns from market open to market close. The horizontal axis of each plot extends from January 1,
1990 to September 30, 2020. The (linear) vertical scale in each plot extends from a return of -100% (bottom of plot) through
0 (explicitly marked, at left) to the largest cumulative overnight return achieved (top of plot). On each plot, the cumulative
overnight and intraday returns on September 30, 2020 (or the last date available) are explicitly marked, at right. The code
used to make this figure is available at Ref. [13]. Data are publicly available from Yahoo! Finance [14].
3by noting that arbitrageurs do not profit by consistently
buying high (as would be necessary to produce the blue
curve) and then selling low (as would be necessary to
produce the green curve).
Consider the argument that since the suspicious return
pattern in United States indices stopped in 2008 (a fact
more apparent when the first two plots in Figure 1 are
plotted with a logarithmic vertical scale [17]), the cause of
the suspicious returns no longer matters. You can point
out that the suspicious return pattern has continued in
all other indices in Figure 1 and in many individual stocks
in the United States [18], so the cause still matters. You
can also point out that this argument does not explain
Figure 1.
Consider finally the assertion that whatever caused
Figure 1 has not moved stock prices from their “funda-
mental value,” due to efficient markets and all that. You
can point out that current stock prices are impressively
high and the difference in total market capitalization be-
tween the blue and green curves in Figure 1 is roughly
fifty trillion dollars. You can also point out that efficient
markets do not look like Figure 1.
The same logic can be straightforwardly applied to
other attempted explanations. Any attempt that does
not explain the large negative intraday returns in Fig-
ure 1 can be discarded. Any attempt invoking the ac-
tions of millions of individual traders must convincingly
reconcile the impressive consistency of Figure 1 with the
stupefying inconsistency of millions of individual traders
over thirty years [19]. Any attempt invoking the actions
of a few traders must explain how consistently buying
high and selling low ends up being profitable.
No plausible innocuous explanation for Figure 1 has
yet been proposed.
III. OBVIOUS EXPLANATION
Now that we understand why certain explanations are
not plausible, let us reason our way to one that is.
The obvious, mechanical explanation of Figure 1 is
somebody trading in a way that pushes prices up be-
fore or at market open (thus causing the blue curve) and
then trading in a way that pushes prices down between
market open and market close (thus causing the green
curve). The striking consistency of these plots points to
the actions of a few quantitative trading firms rather than
the uncoordinated, manual trading of millions of people.
Computers are consistent. People are not.
Trading in a way that pushes prices up overnight and
down intraday is expensive, but the daily expansion and
contraction of a sufficiently large portfolio can create
mark-to-market gains exceeding this cost [1–3]. The re-
sulting risk-return profile is unattractive if the firm is
long the market but acceptable if the firm is market neu-
tral [20]. As discussed in Ref. [2], the systematic ex-
pansion and contraction of a portfolio that is generally
market neutral can leave residual patterns in the overall
market like those appearing in Figure 1.
The obvious suspects are therefore large, market-
neutral quant firms that have been around since the early
1990s, trading in volumes large enough to create the re-
markable patterns in Figure 1. You can read all of this
directly off of Figure 1, and you do not need to be Sher-
lock Holmes to do it.
This obvious explanation (described in more detail in
Refs. [1–3]) is plausible. It naturally handles the striking
consistency of Figure 1 and its large negative intraday
returns. It naturally handles facts you might think would
be damning, including how these extraordinary return
patterns have not been arbitraged away and why nobody
seems to be complaining about them [2]. It naturally
handles China as the exception [1]. It naturally handles
other related observations [21] [22]. It is falsifiable. It is
easy (for regulators) to check [23]. It is the only plausible
explanation so far advanced for Figure 1. It is, ipso facto,
the leading candidate explanation. It is everything but
innocuous.
IV. OBVIOUS PROBLEM
The world’s stock markets display a strikingly sus-
picious pattern of overnight and intraday returns (Sec-
tion I). No variation of “returns are due to the bearing
of risk” can explain the large negative intraday returns
in Figure 1. These plots are too consistent to have been
caused by the uncoordinated actions of millions of indi-
vidual traders. No plausible innocuous explanation for
these extraordinary return patterns has been proposed.
The obvious explanation (Section III) is obviously prob-
lematic.
I seem to be the only person insistently pointing Fig-
ure 1 out as a problem [1–3]. You might conclude from
the silence of others that everything is fine. Fortunately,
you can think for yourself, and at some level this issue is
not hard. You understand the difference between large
positive numbers and large negative numbers. You un-
derstand the difference between blue lines that go up and
green lines that go down. You understand that strikingly
suspicious return patterns in financial markets should be
viewed as a problem until definitively shown otherwise,
not the other way around. You know enough (Section II)
to evaluate candidate explanations for these strikingly
suspicious return patterns for yourself. Because you can
think for yourself, you understand the silence of others
does not mean everything is fine. The world’s stock mar-
kets display a strikingly suspicious pattern of overnight
and intraday returns (Figure 1). I appear to be the only
person persistently trying to alert you to them. Every-
thing is pretty far from fine.
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[19] A preference for numerical tables over plots (which hides
the striking consistency so obvious in Figure 1) and a
tendency to view markets as composed of a large number
of small participants (when in fact the trading of a small
number of large participants dominates the behavior of
most markets in the real world) are among the biases that
have led economists to unproductively seek explanations
for Figure 1 involving large numbers of participants.
[20] The ideal thing to manipulate is something with low
volatility that other people cannot easily see. A single
stock has an annual volatility of ≈30% and is easily
tracked. A slowly-time-varying market-neutral portfolio
(perhaps also hedged against other major risk factors)
has low volatility and is something other people cannot
easily see. As a bonus, there are plenty of ways to get a
portfolio optimizer trading thousands of stocks to fall into
the appropriate trading pattern – systematically expand-
ing your portfolio early in the day and then contracting
it later in the day – while remaining willfully blind as to
how you are actually making money.
[21] The disappearance of the overnight/intraday divergence
in United States indices shortly after Ref. [5] called at-
tention to it in 2008 is consistent with the quant firm(s)
of Section III moving some of their morning portfolio ex-
pansion from before and at market open to after market
open to better hide their footprints, as we recommend in
Ref. [1]. The continued divergence in the rest of the world
is what you might expect from quant firms headquartered
in the United States with a habit of applying their do-
mestically focused research to the rest of the world as an
afterthought.
[22] The natural explanation for the returns to many trad-
ing strategies (e.g., momentum, size, value) displaying
an overnight/intraday split [10] is the daily portfolio ex-
pansion and contraction described in Section III, with
one or more of the quant firms employing these trading
strategies as forecasts or in their risk models.
[23] Only a few large, market-neutral quant firms have been
around since the early 1990s. (Including firms that
started later or have since closed adds another half dozen
or so.) Systematically expanding your existing portfolio
at the start of the day and contracting it later in the
day is a distinctive trading pattern. Quants keep their
data, write internal research reports, and communicate
by email. If any large, long-lived quant firm has traded
in the manner we describe [1–3], somebody knows about
it, and there is probably enough documentation to figure
out who knew what when. If no existing, large, long-lived
quant firm has traded in this manner, a fairly straightfor-
ward analysis of the trading of the most obvious suspects
by regulators should be sufficient to falsify this explana-
tion.
